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Consider the anger that arises in a heated
argument with your romantic partner, or
the dreadful anxious anticipation in the
dentist’s waiting room prior to a root canal
procedure. Our daily lives are densely pop-
ulated with events that make us emotional.
Luckily, however, we developed numerous
ways to control or regulate our emotions
in order to adapt (Gross, 2007; Koole, 2009
for reviews). A central remaining challenge
to explain adaptation, involves under-
standing how individuals choose between
the different emotion regulation strate-
gies in order to fit with differing situa-
tional demands. Specifically, when is the
aforementioned romantic partner or den-
tal patient more likely to “put aside” or dis-
engage from the emotional situation, and
when are they more likely to “make sense”
or engage with their emotional reactions?
In this opinion article we concentrate
on the intersection between affective sci-
ence and decision making as manifested
in emotion regulation choice, defined as
the act of making an autonomous choice
between different regulation strategies that
are available in a particular context.
HOW IMPORTANT ARE OUR EMOTION
REGULATION CHOICES?
Recent advances in the field of emo-
tion regulation suggest that regulation
strategies have different consequences in
different contexts. Accordingly, several
emerging conceptual accounts empha-
size the importance of flexibly choosing
between emotion regulation strategies in
a manner that is adaptive to differing sit-
uational demands (e.g., Bonanno, 2005;
Kashdan and Rottenberg, 2010; Troy and
Mauss, 2011; for reviews).
While emotion regulation choice has
become an important concept in modern
conceptual accounts, direct empirical sup-
port has been lacking until recently. The
main reason is that previous experimental
studies in the field have instructed par-
ticipants to employ rather than choose
between different regulation strategies
(e.g., Bonanno et al., 2004; Westphal et al.,
2010; Webb et al., 2012, for a recent
review), leaving the determinants and
underlying mechanisms of emotion regu-
lation choice unexplored.
To address these important gaps we
recently developed a conceptual frame-
work to explain the (1) major determi-
nants and (2) underlying mechanisms of
emotion regulation choice (Sheppes et al.,
2011, 2013; Sheppes, in press). The start-
ing point of this conceptual framework
was set to explain the differential conse-
quences of employing (rather than choos-
ing between) different regulation strate-
gies (Sheppes and Gross, 2011, 2012).
Specifically, according to this framework
due to limited cognitive capacity, a con-
stant competition emerges between emo-
tion generation and emotion regulation
processes (Gross et al., 2011a,b) for
dominance over behavior. The concep-
tual account borrows from information
processing theories (e.g., Pashler, 1998;
Hubner et al., 2010) and the process
model of emotion regulation (Gross and
Thompson, 2007) to suggest that emotion
regulation, involves recruiting deliberate
executive control mechanisms that try to
modify the nature of emotional informa-
tion processing at two major cognitive
stages: early attentional selection and late
semantic meaning stages.
Incoming emotional information can
be regulated at an early attentional selec-
tion processing stage by disengaging from
emotional information processing before
it undergoes elaborated processing in
working memory (the aforementioned
“put aside” option). A classic early selec-
tion strategy is distraction, which involves
producing neutral thoughts that are inde-
pendent from and not in conflict with
emotional information (e.g., van Dillen
and Koole, 2007; Thiruchselvam et al.,
2011). Engagement with incoming emo-
tional information that passes the early
attentional selection stage can still be regu-
lated at a late semantic meaning processing
stage before it determines behavior (the
aforementioned “make sense” option). A
classic late selection regulation strategy is
reappraisal, which involves changing the
meaning of emotional information in a
late processing stage (e.g., Gross, 2007;
Thiruchselvam et al., 2011; Blechert et al.,
2012). In reappraisal, the original emo-
tional appraisal functions as the building
block of the reinterpretation, and as such
the two are semantically dependent and in
direct conflict.
According to the conceptual frame-
work, the underlying characteristics of dis-
engagement distraction and engagement
reappraisal result in a differential cost-
benefit tradeoff (Sheppes and Gross, 2011,
2012). Specifically, emotionally blocking
affective information early before it gath-
ers force via distraction can modulate
high intensity information more success-
fully, relative to reappraisal that allows
emotional information to gather force
prior to a late modulation (Sheppes and
Meiran, 2007). Cognitively, the generation
process in distraction that involves pro-
ducing neutral thoughts that are indepen-
dent from and not in conflict with the
original emotional information, is simpler
than generating reappraisals, where neu-
tral reinterpretations are in direct conflict
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with emotional appraisals (Sheppes and
Meiran, 2008; Sheppes et al., 2009).
Motivationally, distraction does not allow
for emotional events to be attended to
and provided with adequate explanation
which is non-beneficial in many emo-
tional events where long term adapta-
tion requires facing difficulties in order
to adapt (Wilson and Gilbert, 2008 for
a review), relative to reappraisal which
allows emotional processing (Kross and
Ayduk, 2008; MacNamara et al., 2011;
Thiruchselvam et al., 2011; Blechert et al.,
2012).
Utilizing the original framework
to explain emotion regulation choice
involved hypothesizing that regulatory
choices of healthy individuals would
be sensitive to the costs and benefits
tradeoff associated with the implemen-
tation of each regulatory option in
different contexts. With regard to underly-
ing mechanisms of emotion regulation
choice we argue that healthy regula-
tion choice requires, in some contexts,
the ability to recruit deliberate execu-
tive control processes that can override
contrasting associative emotional pro-
cesses (cf. Muraven and Baumeister, 2000).
Moreover, differences in strategies’ under-
lying engagement with or disengagement
from emotional processing dimension
heavily determine regulation choice, rel-
ative to other potent factors such as
differential cognitive effort.
EMOTION REGULATION CHOICE:
EMOTIONAL, COGNITIVE, AND
MOTIVATIONAL DETERMINANTS
The first determinant of regulation choice
examined is emotional intensity which is
a key dimension of variation across emo-
tional contexts (Sheppes et al., 2011). To
test our predictions, we manipulated emo-
tional intensity with emotional images
or unpredictable electric stimulation and
had participants choose between distrac-
tion and reappraisal (Sheppes et al., 2011).
Confirming the conceptual framework, we
found that under low negative intensity
situations, participants prefer late selec-
tion engagement reappraisal over early
selection disengagement distraction, pre-
sumably because reappraisal can both
successfully modulate immediate emo-
tional responding as well as provide long
term adaptation. However, under high
negative intensity situations participants
mostly prefer early disengagement distrac-
tion over reappraisal, because only dis-
traction can successfully block emotional
information before it gathers force. A fol-
low up study demonstrated the robustness
of this effect in showing that both reg-
ulatory preferences are maintained even
when participants are offered high mon-
etary amounts to choose the contrasting
strategy (Sheppes et al., 2013).
The second determinant of regulation
choice examined was the cognitive com-
plexity of generating a strategy (Sheppes
et al., 2013). According to the concep-
tual framework, the generation process
in reappraisal is more complex than in
distraction because the formation of a
neutral reinterpretation depends on the
original appraisal of emotional informa-
tion. It was therefore predicted and found
that when the generation process was
simplified, by providing participants with
concrete regulatory suggestions for dis-
traction and reappraisal, reappraisal was
more frequently chosen.
The third determinant of emotion reg-
ulation choice involved investigating the
influence of motivational goals (Sheppes
et al., 2013). According to our framework,
emotional stimuli that are encountered
multiple times can be better regulated
for long term adaptation with strategies
like reappraisal that involve engaging with
emotional processing. As predicted, it was
found that participants who anticipated
encountering emotional stimuli more than
once preferred to reappraise more than
participants who expected to encounter
each emotional stimulus only once.
The aforementioned emotional, cog-
nitive, and motivational factors tended
to independently influence regulatory
choices between distraction and reap-
praisal manifested in findings main
effects.
EMOTION REGULATION CHOICE:
UNDERLYING MECHANISMS
According to our conceptual frame-
work, emotion regulation choice should
involve a general ability of deliberate
executive control processes to override
competing associative emotional pro-
cesses. An alternative more parsimonious
account, suggests that emotion regulation
choice can be fully explained by a direct
influence from simple associative emo-
tional processes (e.g., Bradley et al.,
2001). Specifically, a basic defensive sys-
tem directly motivates the organism
toward engagement (resulting in reap-
praisal) under low negative intensity
situations, and toward disengagement
(resulting in distraction) under high neg-
ative intensity. To determine between
the two accounts we investigated a con-
text where the two accounts would
diverge—down-regulation of positive-
emotional situations. Specifically, the
associative-emotional process account
would argue that as positive emotional
intensity increases it directly activates a
basic appetitive system that would lead
to an increased preference to engage. By
contrast, we found that the operation of
deliberate control processes, whose goal
is to provide down-regulation of positive
emotional situations, involved overriding
the associative tendency to engage, result-
ing in an increased preference to disengage
as positive emotional intensity increased
(Sheppes et al., 2013).
A further investigation of underlying
mechanisms involved asking what are the
dimensions that receive central weight in
the choice between distraction and reap-
praisal? Two potential central dimensions
include engagement/disengagement and
cognitive effort involved in distraction and
reappraisal. Specifically, when people pre-
fer to distract in high negative emotional
intensity situations, are they choosing dis-
traction mainly because they prefer to
disengage from emotional processing or
mainly because they prefer to reserve cog-
nitive resources?
To begin investigating this issue we
pitted these two alternative accounts
by having participants choose between
two types of distractions: one regulatory
optionwas cognitively simple and involved
minor disengagement from emotional
processing (performing mathematical
subtract 2s) and a second regulatory
option was cognitively effortful yet highly
disengaging from emotional processing
(subtract 7s). Findings supported the cen-
trality of the engagement/disengagement
factor with an increased preference to use
the more disengaging (despite it being also
more effortful) subtract 7s distraction as
negative emotional intensity increased.
These findings suggest that individuals are
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willing to exert substantial cognitive effort
in order to obtain adequate levels of dis-
engagement. Nevertheless, future studies
should parametrically manipulate varying
levels of engagement/disengagement and
cognitive effort in order to better under-
stand the relationship between them. In a
complementary study we showed that the
engagement/disengagement dimension
is central within the reappraisal cate-
gory. Specifically, we found that under
high negative emotional intensity partic-
ipants choose to use “reality challenge”
reappraisals (e.g., “this picture is fake”)
which involves disengaging by not consid-
ering emotional consequences of events
(Sheppes et al., 2013).
We end this section with broader con-
siderations that should be investigated in
future studies. First, while our concep-
tual model makes a broad distinction
between early and late selection regula-
tion strategies, empirical support comes
from studies that concentrate on only one
early selection strategy (distraction) and
one late selection strategy (reappraisal).
It is clear that people typically use many
other strategies and that their regula-
tory choice patterns may have impor-
tant consequences for well-being and psy-
chopathology. Consider avoidance which
disengages from emotional processing at
an early selection stage, and rumina-
tion which involves magnifying emotional
information at an early attentional stage
and elaborating it in a late selection phase.
Our account suggests that deviations from
the preference to disengage from high
emotional intensity by overly engaging
via rumination may be related to depres-
sion (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). At
the same time, deviations from the pref-
erence to engage with tolerable emotional
intensity events by disengaging via avoid-
ance may be linked to anxiety disorders
(Campbel-Sills and Barlow, 2007).
Second, we concentrated on deliber-
ate regulatory choices among explicit
regulation strategies. While the vastmajor-
ity of studies in the field concentrated
on explicit forms of regulation (Gross
and Thompson, 2007), implicit forms
of emotion regulation are central and
dominant (Gyurak et al., 2011). Given
that unconscious processes can perform
most complex functions (Hassin, 2013),
it may well be that regulatory decision
making processes, including those that
make use of central executive resources
(see Marien et al., 2012), can be per-
formed unconsciously. Central factors
such as prior practice with choosing reg-
ulation strategies in different situations,
strong motivational forces to perform one
strategy over another and a general cen-
tral executive ability that allows efficient
information processing may all influence
regulatory choices. Future studies should
link explicit and implicit processes in
determining emotion regulation choice
(see Sheppes and Gross, under review, for
such an effort).
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